What Psychopathy Reveals About Free Will and Moral Responsibility*

*This paper was submitted as the final paper of my Psychopathy and Psychopaths course.

May, 2025

1. Introduction

What if morality isn't a matter of will, but a consequence of how our brains are wired?

This paper is a philosophical exploration of free will, determinism, and psychopathy. Drawing from neuroscientific case studies and philosophical arguments, I ask: What does psychopathy reveal about the relationship between brain, mind, and moral responsibility? If a psychopath’s actions stem from impaired emotional circuitry rather than malice—are they still blameworthy? And if not, what does that say about the rest of us?

Carrying certain neurological and environmental propensities, psychopathic individuals have trouble making moral judgements based on empathetic processes. Some studies have tried to find genetic predictions of future dangerousness and some discuss whether early measures should be taken. Some believe that regardless of the etiology of the disorder, psychopathy does not per se justify the assumption of decreased legal responsibility (Herpertz, Sass, 2000). Some argue that since they know right from wrong, they should not benefit from the insanity defense and be held accountable for their actions. Darby (2020) challenges traditional views of moral responsibility by emphasizing that moral agency requires more than just rational understanding—it also depends on affective and motivational integration, which psychopaths lack.

2. The Neuroscience of Moral Decision-Making in Psychopathy

Neuroscientific studies have repeatedly shown that decision making is not a process isolated from emotions. For instance, Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis and studies on patients with vmPFC damage show that without emotional input, individuals cannot even make basic decisions (Bechara et al., 1997). Emotions particularly play important role in making moral decisions. As Haidt (2001) explains, moral judgments stem from quick emotional responses, with reasoning serving to justify these judgments after the fact.

Research indicates that psychopathic individuals tend to give calculated responses to moral decision making tasks and make utilitarian decisions in moral dilemmas like the trolley problem, showing less mental disturbance to the idea of sacrificing one person to save many (Koenigs et al., 2012). Empathy deficits also influence moral decision making: studies found that lower levels of empathic concern, particularly towards victims, are associated with a greater likelihood of making utilitarian choices in moral dilemmas. Neuroimaging studies of incarcerated individuals with psychopathy have shown reduced activation in empathy-related regions during moral scenarios, highlighting their emotional detachment (Decety, Skelly, & Kiehl, 2013).

3. Case Study: Brain Damage and Moral Culpability

Such an impairment can also be due to a physical damage in the regions caused by an accident or an illness. Mr. Oft, for instance, an interesting case (Burns & Swerdlow, 2003), was a regular guy who started collecting pornography, developed compulsive pedophilic urges and socially inappropriate behaviors. He was found guilty of child molesting and diagnosed with pedophilia. When he started having other problems, they found out that there was a tumor occupying a large portion of his frontal lobe, in the orbitofrontal cortex, a region crucial for impulse control and decision making. After surgical removal, the urges disappeared—returning when the tumor relapsed, clearly showing the behaviors were caused by the tumor.

His case raises the questions whether Mr Oft was responsible and was to be held accountable for abusing his step-daughter and for his other inappropriate behaviors. Was he not innocent, in a way? And if Mr. Oft’s behavior is excused due to neural damage, what do we say about those whose neural impairments result from early trauma? This brings us to the question of moral responsibility in psychopathy.

4. Are Psychopaths Morally Responsible?

Psychopaths, despite understanding right from wrong intellectually, lack the emotional responses—like empathy and guilt—that typically guide moral behavior. Neuroimaging studies with psychopathic individuals have shown reduced activity in brain regions like the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex during moral decision-making tasks. These structures are key in processing emotional cues and integrating them into moral reasoning. It seems that emotional deficits in psychopathy may arise from atypical development in neural systems responsible for social affiliation and affective bonding—differences often rooted in early life adversity or biological predispositions (Viding & McCrory, 2019).

As a result, individuals with psychopathic traits often respond to moral dilemmas with cold, utilitarian logic rather than emotional sensitivity. So in the case of a psychopath, the ‘tumor’ is not removable. It’s built into their brain structure shaped by causes -similarly- out of their will and control.

But if reduced capacity due to biological factors is grounds for diminished responsibility, then this opens a slippery slope: ADHD, how we decide the age of legal majority or consent, substance use, gender-based hormonal influences should also fall into the same logic. Where do we draw the line? The boundaries become quite blurry when we take biology seriously in moral responsibility.

5. The Free Will vs. Determinism Debate

This brings about the question whether moral responsibility exists at all. Are any of us truly free in the choices we make? Proponents of free will believe we can choose independently of both internal and external influences. But as findings in psychology, specifically behavioral psychology have accumulated, the idea that human behaviors were caused by determinants gained popularity. Skinner’s work showed how external causes shape behavior and how easily it can be reinforced, leading him to reject the influence of internal cognitive processes like thoughts and feelings. This view is known as hard determinism. As Sapolsky (2023) argues, our actions are the result of a complex interplay of neurobiology, environment, and development —rendering the idea of free will, and therefore moral responsibility, biologically implausible. Soft determinism, on the other hand, also called compatibilism, leaves space for some free agency. Psychic determinism, a psychoanalytic view, holds that unconscious motives drive behavior—even when we believe we are choosing freely. Psychoanalysts believe that the only way to be truly free is by bringing the unconscious material into consciousness.

Even everyday choices, like eating ice cream on a hot day, may reflect biological states like low blood sugar rather than free intent. Yet, given the fact that all of our actions, wills and desires can be traced back to neuronal firings, history of upbringing, socio-economic status, biological circumstances, do any of us act upon conscious intent?

If a psychopath is not morally responsible for his actions, then neither are we. If free will is an illusion, ethics and justice lose their foundation. Obviously, psychologists and the legal system operate on a compatibilist assumption or at least favor interactionist approaches, assuming most individuals have enough free will to be held accountable for their actions, except in specific narrowly defined cases.

The famous experiment conducted by Benjamin Libet (1983) poses a challenge to the free will argument. In the experiment, participants were asked to perform a simple task such as flexing their wrist or pressing a button and reporting the moment when they decided to make the move. Libet measured brain activity, called the readiness potential, milliseconds before the person became consciously aware of deciding to act. This was a challenge against the notion that conscious intention causes action suggesting that free will might be an illusion.

One of the other studies providing neuroscientific support for determinism was a study done by Soon et al. (2008) where researchers investigated whether simple decisions could be predicted before participants became consciously aware of making them. Participants were asked to freely decide whether to press a button with their left or right hand while watching a randomized letter stream on a screen, and to report the letter they saw at the moment they became aware of their decision. Activity patterns allowed the researchers to predict the participant’s choice up to seven seconds before the participant reported conscious awareness of deciding.

Such Libet-style experiments have been criticized for their methodology and studying actions that are too trivial (Roskies, 2010), as moral decisions are actually a result of more elaborate deliberation and a longer reflection. So, such experiments fall short in testing complex and intricate matters, and therefore, are not generalizable. A study done by Greene et al. (2001) demonstrated the complexity of decision making by showing that emotional and rational brain systems interact during moral decision-making. When our brain engages in slow, reflective moral judgement it shows active, conscious processing, not just automatic reactions, supporting the idea of some sort of free agency.

Furthermore, based on the slow window in which the conscious mind could intervene, Libet himself suggested that even though we may not initiate actions ourselves, we can veto them, an argument named the “Free Won’t”, suggesting a limited, but real kind of agency.

6. McGilchrist’s Hemispheric View

Psychiatrist and philosopher Iain McGilchrist offers a nuanced, hemishperic view of free will that challenges the typical divide between determinism and agency. In The Master and His Emissary, he describes two very different ways the brain relate to the world. He explains that the left hemisphere sees the world through a mechanistic lens. It breaks things down into isolated parts, looks for clear cause-and-effect patterns, and seeks control, consistency, and predictability. The right hemisphere, on the other hand, is oriented toward meaning, values, and future possibilities. It processes things more holistically, pays attention to context, and allows room for emotion and intuition.

Referring to Libet’s experiment, he favors the idea of “free won’t” as a more accurate account of freedom. Free will is not reduced to conscious deliberation but includes unconscious emotional and embodied processes. From this view, people with psychopathy, who often have trouble with emotions and right-brain functions, might not have the full sense of self needed for moral responsibility. It’s not that they lack intelligence, but that they are cut off from the feelings and values that usually guide our choices. McGilchrist’s framework suggests that psychopathy may be linked to a dominance of left-hemisphere reasoning, lacking the emotional attunement of the right.

7. Conclusion: No Easy Answers

A determinist might say that even the ability to object or “veto” an action—what Libet called “free won’t”—is also shaped by personality, which is just another result of brain wiring and past experience. So what if the difference between someone who breaks the law and someone who follows it really just comes down to how their brain is wired? When we go deep enough, everything becomes wiring. And then the question becomes: who decides which wiring is better? Once you blur those lines, you start to see that there might not be one “right” way to be. Maybe morality isn’t one thing—it’s many. In such a world, there could be as many moral frameworks as there are individuals, each shaped by a unique wiring. Which one, then, is superior?

And sometimes, making decisions without emotion leads to better results. But the consequences of an action are not merely what determines what is moral. Thought experiments like the trolley problem act like it’s just about counting how many people live or die. But real life situations aren’t that simple or isolated.

Consider the following thought experiment: In one case, many children die from a natural cause like a disease. In another, one child dies because someone chose to hurt them. Which is worse? The pause shows that morality isn’t just numbers—it’s about meaning, about what feels wrong, even if we can’t measure it.

If we really are just biological machines, like Sapolsky and others suggest, then what’s the point of the illusion of free will? Why do we even need a story about acting freely?

In the end, I don’t think there’s a final answer to whether free will is real or if psychopaths are fully responsible. What this shows is how complicated the whole matter is. Our choices come from so many things—biology, trauma, upbringing—that are mostly out of our hands. Here, I favor the “free won’t” argument as well, not convinced by a strict determinist view. This inquiry doesn’t offer a final answer to the question of free will or moral responsibility—but it shows just how complex and deeply human the question is. The human condition is too layered, too interconnected, to be reduced to cause-effect calculations.

References

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